MOSCOW, November 13 - RAPSI, Ingrid Burke. More important than all of the drama emulating from the ladies involved in the scandal surrounding the resignation of former CIA Director David Petraeus is that of the wrench thrown into America’s balance of powers. The FBI’s failure to disclose its investigation of the Petraeus/Broadwell affair to the congressional intelligence oversight committees appears to have exacerbated the already complicated ties between the divisions of government charged with intelligence activities and oversight thereof.
Petraeus submitted his resignation from the CIA position last week, explaining that after having been married for over 37 years, he “showed extremely poor judgment by engaging in an extramarital affair.” It soon emerged that the woman involved was his biographer Paula Broadwell, who had worked closely with the retired general in gathering information for her book All In: The Education of General David Petraeus. An FBI report investigating harassing emails sent by Broadwell to MacDill Air Force Base social planner Jill Kelley led to the affair’s discovery.
Citing unnamed government officials, the New York Times reported Monday that high-ranking FBI and Department of Justice officials knew as early as last summer about the affair, but refrained from relaying the information to external sources based on the fact that the investigation was young and that no immediate security threats appeared to be looming.
Since Petraeus’ resignation went public, a number of congressional officials have declared their intentions to get to the bottom of the scandal.
According to the Times, Senate intelligence oversight committee chairwoman Dianne Feinstein declared her intention Sunday to demand answers.
Peter King, the highest-ranking Republican on the House Homeland Security Committee told CNN Sunday that, "It just doesn't add up… You have this type of investigation. The FBI investigating e-mails, the e-mails leading to the CIA director, and taking four months to find out that the CIA director was involved. I have real questions about this. I think a timeline has to be looked at and analyzed to see what happened." Fox reported Sunday that Diane Feinstein had explained, “this is something that could have had an effect on national security.”
Congressional oversight of intelligence activities was established for the Senate in 1976 and for the House in 1977. According to Senate Resolution 400, which established the Senate oversight committee, its purpose was, “to oversee and make continuing studies of the intelligence activities and programs of the United States Government, and to submit to the Senate appropriate proposals for legislation and report to the Senate concerning such intelligence activities and programs.” The definition of “intelligence activities” within the text of the law is fairly broad, extending – among many other directions – to: “the collection, analysis, production, dissemination, or use of information about activities of persons within the United States, its territories and possessions, or nationals of the United States abroad whose political and related activities pose, or may be considered by any department, agency, bureau, office, division, instrumentality, or employee of the United States to pose, a threat to the internal security of the United States, and covert or clandestine activities directed against such persons.”
So on one side, the FBI reportedly refrained from disclosing its investigation based on a lack of any imminent security threats; on the other, the leading senator in charge of intelligence oversight claims that the affair could have impacted national security. In accordance with the law on congressional oversight, a determination of who was right on this particular point will answer the question of who was right on the point of when the investigation should have been disclosed to the congressional committees. If it can be proven – for example – that the Petraeus affair could have exposed the former leader to threats of blackmail, this point could militate in Congress’ favor.
Still, it likely won’t be so straight forward. Congressional oversight of the intelligence community is a complicated matter that has, at times, proved controversial and somewhat divisive. In an essay published on the CIA’s website in 2007, James S. Van Wagenen – who at the time was serving as DIA Chair at the Joint Military Intelligence College – described the two sides of the controversy as follows: “Some individuals within the [Intelligence Community (IC)] have argued, with a certain amount of justification, that Congressional oversight has been intrusive, meddling, short-sighted, and counterproductive; has involved micromanagement on a grand scale; and has served to drag the IC into the political cockpit of partisan politics from which it had previously been immune. Others tend to view Congressional oversight as being, on balance and after a somewhat rocky start in the late 1970s, a decided plus for the Community by providing loci for Congressional advocacy and support for intelligence and by providing rigorous review and questioning of intelligence activities and budgets.”
This is an issue without an easy answer that likely won’t end anytime soon, particularly as Congress’ Petraeus concerns expand in scope to include questions of other disclosures, particularly those relating to the September 11 Benghazi consulate attack that killed four American officials, including US Ambassador to Libya Christopher Stevens.
As Senator Feinstein told NBC News’ Andrea Mitchell Monday, “I have no doubt now that we will need to talk with David Petraeus and we will likely do that in closed session. But it will be done one way or another.” She went on to declare her intention to look into a trip Petraeus allegedly made to Libya shortly prior to his resignation, noting, “[i]t may have some very relevant information to what happened in Benghazi.”
It would appear that Congress’ claws are out in a feud that could have an important impact on its role as overseer of national intelligence.
This conflict may prove key in drawing attention to certain drawbacks present in the current congressional oversight structure. Many have criticized congressional intelligence oversight in recent years. In his 2005 essay “Congressional Oversight and the Crippling of the CIA,” then-University of Virginia professor Stephen F. Knott – now a professor at the United States Naval War College – explored the detrimental effect congressional interference can have on intelligence activities, considering the unique nature of this work. He explained, “While the old CIA may have been noted for the ‘cowboy’ swagger of its personnel, the new CIA is, in the words of one critic, composed of ‘cautious bureaucrats who avoid the risks that come with taking action, who fill out every form in triplicate’ and put ‘the emphasis on audit rather than action.’ Congressional meddling is primarily responsible for this new CIA ethos, transforming it from an agency willing to take risks, and act at times in a Machiavellian manner, into just another sclerotic Washington bureaucracy… In becoming a partner (if not outright owner) of the CIA, Congress has put itself in the uncomfortable position of having to approve of objectionable measures. This most democratic branch of government is simply not designed to make the tough and often distasteful decisions that are required of nations competing in the international arena.”
